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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 2004, Sherman Maxwell, who was doing business as Von Zippers Custom 
Cycles, entered into a joint venture with Small Block Enterprises, Inc. Under the parties' 
agreement, they would purchase, repair/refurbish, and re-sell all manner of vehicles 
(automobiles, pickup trucks, and watercraft), splitting the profits on a 50/50 basis. They 
also had one project where they built a motorcycle from the ground up, with the intent of 
selling it for a profit (again, to be split on a 50/50 basis). Generally speaking, Small 
Block was the "money" partner, buying totaled vehicles and/or purchasing the 
necessary parts, and Von Zippers was the "expertise" partner, doing all the actual work. 
Unfortunately, the business relationship between Von Zippers and Small Block 
fell apart after only a few months. After Mr. Maxwell sold the motorcycle he had been 
building with Small Block (which happened to have a motor whose "motor number," i.e., 
serial number, had apparently been gouged out) and failed to share the proceeds with 
Small Block, he was charged with three felonies: grand theft of the motorcycle; 
defacing, destroying, or obliterating a motor number; and knowingly selling a vehicle 
whose motor number has been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. Following a jury trial, 
Mr. Maxwell was found guilty of all three felonies, received a suspended sentence and 
was placed on probation, and was ordered to pay restitution. 
On appeal, Mr. Maxwell presents three claims of error: (1) there is insufficient 
evidence to support the grand theft conviction because the trial evidence showed that 
he was a co-owner of the motorcycle; (2) the indictment was improperly amended to 
allege different offenses (stemming from the defaced, destroyed, or obliterated motor 
number) than had been considered by the grand jury; and (3) even if the grand theft 
1 
conviction can properly stand, the restitution award stemming from that count was 
improperly calculated. Mr. Maxwell requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
sentences and order an acquittal on the grand theft charge and a dismissal of the other 
two charges. Alternatively, he requests that the restitution amount awarded to National 
Indemnity Company (Small Block's insurer) be reduced by $5,000. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Sherman "Sonny" Maxwell appears to be quite adept at building and repairing all 
things mechanical. (See 2007 PSI, pp.7-8.) 1 For a time, he owned and operated a very 
successful boat repair, maintenance, and transport company; upon moving to Idaho in 
1993, he owned an auto body business (Black Hawk Auto Body), which he ran for 
approximately eight years; and, in 2001, he started a custom motorcycle business (Von 
Zippers Custom Cycles), whereby he not only worked on motorcycles, but also 
continued working on automobiles. (2006 PSI, pp.7-8; 2007 PSI, pp.7-8; Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.335, Ls.1-10.2) 
1 There were two pre-sentence investigation reports prepared in this case. The first, 
filed with the district court on June 12, 2006 (hereinafter, 2006 PSI), was created in 
anticipation of a June 21, 2006 sentencing hearing; however, because the district court 
apparently rejected the parties' proposed plea agreement (see Tr. Vol. II, p.149, L.19 -
p.150, L.10), Mr. Maxwell's case instead proceeded to trial. Therefore, an updated 
report was filed on May 24, 2007 (hereinafter, 2007 PSI), in anticipation of 
Mr. Maxwell's July 20, 2007 sentencing hearing (which was continued to August 17, 
2007 (see R., pp.318-20)). 
2 There are a number of separately-bound volumes of transcripts in the record on 
appeal in this case. The volume containing the transcript of the April 7, 2005 grand jury 
proceedings is referenced herein as "Tr. Vol. I"; the volume containing transcripts of a 
host of pretrial hearings (held January 5, 2006, March 21, 2006, May 4, 2006, June 21, 
2006, September 7, 2006, and July 10, 2007), as well as the transcript of Mr. Maxwell's 
August 17, 2007 sentencing hearing), is referenced herein, as "Tr. Vol. II"; the volume 
containing a transcript of the non-evidentiary portion (e.g., jury instruction conference, 
discussion of Mr. Maxwell's motion in limine, and opening statements) of the first day 
(April 9, 2007) of Mr. Maxwell's trial is referenced as "Tr. Vol. Ill"; the volume containing 
a transcript of the evidentiary portion (the testimony of James Witherspoon) of the first 
2 
In early 2004, Mr. Maxwell met James Witherspoon. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.335, L 1 
- p.336, L.15.) Mr. Witherspoon is a home remodeler who operated his home 
remodeling business, Witherspoon Homes, Inc., as well as a "side" or "hobby" business, 
Small Block Enterprises, Inc., a car renovation business. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.5, Ls.2-22; Tr. 
Vol. VI, p.38, Ls.4-8.) Also involved in both of these businesses was Mr. Witherspoon's 
wife, Diana Witherspoon. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.48, Ls.2-8.) 
Apparently, the Witherspoons did not conduct much (or any) business through 
Small Block until they met Mr. Maxwell in early 2004. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.49, L.21 -
p.50, L.11.) In March of that year though, Mr. Maxwell (through Von Zippers) and 
Mr. Witherspoon (through Small Block) entered into an arrangement whereby Small 
Block would put up the money to purchase "totaled" cars and the parts needed to fix 
them, Von Zippers would repair and refurbish the vehicles, and the parties would then 
split the profits upon sale of the repaired/refurbished cars. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.336, Ls.16-21, 
p.340, Ls.7-12; see Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.2- p.138, L.24 (Mrs. Witherspoon testifying as 
to the business relationship generally); see also Tr. Vol. IV, p. 7, L.18 - p.9, L.6 
(Mr. Witherspoon discussing the agreement as to the first project undertaken by the Von 
Zippers/Small Block joint venture).) Unfortunately, no written contract was ever 
executed to memorialize the terms of the overall arrangement, or any of the individual 
day (April 9, 2007) of Mr. Maxwell's trial is referenced as "Tr. Vol. IV"; the volume 
containing a transcript of the hearing on the State's motion in limine on the morning of 
the second day (April 10, 2007) of Mr. Maxwell's trial is referenced as "Tr. Vol. V"; the 
volume containing a transcript of the balance of Mr. Maxwell's trial, i.e., most of the 
proceedings held on the second day of trial, April 10, 2007, and all of the proceedings 
held on April 11 and 12, 2007, is referenced as "Tr. Vol. VI"; the volume containing a 
transcript of the restitution hearing held on December 13, 2007, is referenced as 
'Tr. Vol. VII"; and the volume containing transcripts of the remaining post-trial hearings 
on the matter of restitution and Mr. Maxwell's motion for a new trial (April 22, 2008, 
February 9, 2010, August 11, 2010, November 5, 2010, and January 21, 2011) are 
referenced as "Tr. Vol. VIII." 
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projects undertaken as part of this arrangement. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.23, Ls.5-8; Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.138, Ls.8-16.) 
As it turns out, Von Zippers and Small Block initiated many projects over the 
approximately four months of their venture. It appears these projects included at least 
four pickup trucks, three automobiles, two watercraft, and one motorcycle. (See Ex. T.) 
With regard to the motorcycle project,3 which is at issue in this case, the 
agreement was largely the same as for all of the other projects that were part of the Von 
Zippers/Small Block joint venture, except that Mr. Maxwell was going to build the 
motorcycle from the ground up. Specifically, the deal was that Von Zippers was going 
to contribute certain parts, Small Block was going to purchase the rest of the necessary 
parts, Von Zippers (Mr. Maxwell) was going to build the bike, and Von Zippers and 
Small Block were going to sell the bike and split the profits 50/50. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-
8 (Mr. Witherspoon's testimony), p.9, Ls.2-8 (same), p.23, Ls.5-15 (same); Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.347, Ls.11-25 (Mr. Maxwell's testimony), p.373, Ls.11-17(same), p.401, L.17-p.402, 
L.6 (same), 408, Ls.2-9 (same).)4 In furtherance of this project, Small Block paid for a 
3 There appears to be conflicting testimony as to when the motorcycle project was 
initiated. According to Mr. Witherspoon, the motorcycle was the very first project on 
which Von Zippers and Small Block collaborated. (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9, L.1.) 
However, Mr. Maxwell testified that the motorcycle project did not come into being until 
May or early June 2004 (Tr. Vol. VI, p.347, Ls.11-15), which would have been well into 
the Von Zippers/Small Block joint venture. 
4 Throughout this case, Mrs. Witherspoon has attempted to characterize the agreement 
with regard to the motorcycle very differently. She testified before the grand jury that 
Mr. Maxwell was going to build a bike for the Witherspoons and, under the agreement, 
they (the Witherspoons) would: pay for most of the parts; reimburse Mr. Maxwell for the 
parts he contributed; pay Mr. Maxwell for his labor; and, when completed, take 
ownership of the bike. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.15 - p.14, L.6.) She made a similar claim at 
Mr. Maxwell's trial (Tr. Vol. VI, p.53, Ls.19-22, p.55, Ls.5-8, p.84, Ls.3-11 ), and at a 
restitution hearing (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62, Ls.21-23.) However, Mrs. Witherspoon's 
testimony in this regard has proven untrue. At trial, she conceded that she was not 
involved in the formation of the agreement regarding the motorcycle, as those 
discussions were between her husband and Mr. Maxwell (Tr. Vol. VI, p.52, Ls.8-17 
4 
(admitting that she "was not particularly involved in the discussions about building the 
motorcycle," and that her understanding of the deal struck was based on conversations 
from her husband), p.63, Ls.10-13 (conceding that "this was more of Mr. Witherspoon 
and Mr. Maxwell's project," and that she "was one on the outside."), so her 
characterizations of the contract could not have been based on firsthand knowledge. 
Moreover, the only State's witness who did have firsthand knowledge of the terms of the 
contract, Mr. Witherspoon, testified that the agreement was for Von Zippers to 
contribute certain parts, Small Block to purchase the rest of the necessary parts, 
Von Zippers to build the bike, and Von Zippers and Small Block to sell the bike and split 
the profits 50/50. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15.) 
Mrs. Witherspoon further testified before the grand jury that, when the bike was 
nearly complete, it was titled in the Witherspoons' names, and a "final payment" of 
$5,000 was made to Mr. Maxwell on the bike. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.18-25, p.13, L 12 -
p.14, L.8.) At trial, although she continued to claim that the $5,000 check given to 
Mr. Maxwell was a payment for the parts and labor he contributed to the motorcycle 
project, and she continued to assert that the deal was for the Witherspoon's to pay for 
and take ownership of the bike, she now characterized the $5,000 payment as a 
"prepayment" and explained that "[nJot all the work was done, but we were giving him 
money ahead and just kind of securing it by a note, because if he didn't finish the bike, 
we wanted the money back. It was just sort of a silly way of getting it secured, I guess." 
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.53, L.25 - p.54, L21; see also Tr. Vol. VI, p.61, L.20 - p.62, L.1 (testifying 
that she was "pretty sure" that the $5,000 check given to Mr. Maxwell was intended to 
be payment for the motorcycle).) As it turns out though, Ms. Witherspoon's testimony in 
this regard turned out to be demonstrably false as well, as the $5,000 payment was only 
tangentially related to the motorcycle project. Mr. Witherspoon testified that he was the 
one who made the $5,000 payment to Mr. Maxwell, and that this payment was a loan 
made to Mr. Maxwell because Mr. Maxwell was behind on his bills. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14, 
L.21 - p.15, L.4, p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24; see also Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.62, Ls.17-19 (Mrs. Witherspoon admitting she was not present for the discussions 
between Mr. Witherspoon and Mr. Maxwell concerning the agreement for the $5,000 
payment).) Indeed, the check itself was drawn on the account of Witherspoon Homes, 
Inc., not Small Block or the Witherspoons personally (see Plaintiff's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. IV, 
p.41, Ls.4-11); it was secured by a promissory note making no mention of a motorcycle 
and requiring repayment within one year (see Defendant's Ex. F); and the 
Witherspoons' letter demanding repayment of the note made no mention of any 
motorcycle (see Defendant's Ex. U). Indeed, Mr. Witherspoon testified that the $5,000 
loan was not specifically tied to the motorcycle. ( See Tr. Vol. VI, p.43, L. 7 - p.45, L.12.) 
Thus, the only relationship this loan had to the motorcycle project, it seems, was that 
when Mr. Witherspoon made the loan, he anticipated that Mr. Maxwell could repay it out 
of his share of the profits on the sale of the bike. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.15, Ls.5-8, p.38, L.8 -
p.39, L.17; see also Tr. Vol. VI, p.33, L.12-p.34, L.17 (Mr. Witherspoon testifying that 
he felt that the motorcycle would be his "security" on the $5,000 loan).) In fact, 
Mr. Witherspoon testified that Mr. Maxwell eventually signed title to the motorcycle over 
to the Witherspoons as security on the note. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.20, Ls.2-13; Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.35, Ls.1-19.) 
It is notable that, in its post-trial briefing in this case, the State conceded the 
agreements in question are as stated herein. (See State's Response to Defendant's 
5 
Harley Davidson motor (and certain other parts), and Von Zippers contributed a frame 
and (and certain other parts). (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, L.21 - p.13, L.1 (Mr. Witherspoon 
testifying that he purchased the motor for approximately $3500, and made a separate 
$2,300+ purchase of miscellaneous parts), p.16, L.19 - p.27, L.8 (Mr. Witherspoon 
testifying that he paid for the ignition, while Mr. Maxwell supplied the frame, the wheels, 
the transmission, and the starter), p.66, Ls.14-15 (Mrs. Witherspoon testifying that she 
and her husband purchased the engine).) 
It was not long before the business relationship soured. According to Mr. 
Maxwell, after Small Block purchased the first two vehicles, Mrs. Witherspoon came into 
the picture and put a strain on the relationship: "[S]he was real excited and wanted to go 
to the auction. So all of a sudden every week [they] were at the auction and she's 
buying more and more cars." (Tr. Vol. VI. p.339, L.23 - p.341, L.1.) According to 
Mr. Maxwell, he had so many projects going with Small Block that were taking up all of 
his time; unfortunately, because the Witherspoons did not want to sell anything, for 
months he had no money coming in. (Tr., p.340, L.18 - p.342, L.5, p.344, L.4 - p.345, 
L.5, p.346, L.16 - p.347, L.7, p.381, Ls.15-23.) As a result, Mr. Maxwell testified, he 
twice had to borrow money from the Witherspoons-once for $1,500, and once for 
$5,000. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.342, L.2 - p.346, L.15; Ex. C (promissory note for the $1,500 
loan, dated April 15, 2004); Ex. F (promissory note for the $5,000 loan, dated May 17, 
2004).5) 
Motion for New Trial and Supporting Brief, pp.4-6 (May 6, 2010) (attached to motion to 
augment record filed contemporaneously herewith).) 
5 The promissory note that is Exhibit F relates to the same $5,000 loan discussed in 
note 4, supra. As discussed above, Mrs. Witherspoon tried to characterize this loan as 
the Witherspoons' payment on the motorcycle. 
6 
Even though he was borrowing money from the Witherspoons to keep his 
business and himself afloat, Mr. Maxwell apparently still felt that Small Block and Von 
Zippers should be selling some of their jointly-owned vehicles. Thus, in June of 2004, 
he took two vehicles to California to sell at auction to raise some money. (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.366, L.24 - p.367, L.20.) According to Mr. Maxwell, this did not sit well with 
Mrs. Witherspoon. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.367, Ls.5-6.) He contends that while he was away, 
the Witherspoons came to his place of business and took all of the vehicles, except 
those (such as the motorcycle) that were locked inside his shop.6 (See Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.367, Ls.2-19.) 
Believing that the Witherspoons were selling the joint venture's property without 
sharing the proceeds with him, Mr. Maxwell felt "all bets were off." (See Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.408, Ls.10-13.) Thus, in August of 2004, Mr. Maxwell sold the unfinished motorcycle7 
to a third party, Phil Neff, through eBay. 8 (Tr. Vol. VI, p.374, L.18 - p.375, L.15.) He 
testified that he sold it at that time partly because he needed some income, and partly 
6 The Witherspoons did not testify as to these matters in the State's case-in-chief. ( See 
generally Tr. Vol. IV, p.4, L.12 - p.44, L.6 (testimony of James Witherspoon); Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.29, L.14 - p.46, L.22 (same), p.47, L.8 - p.164, L.2.) Nor did they testify in rebuttal. 
(See Tr. Vol. VI, p.421, L.12-14.) 
7 Throughout this case, there has been uncertainty as to whether the bike sold to 
Mr. Neff was the same bike Mr. Maxwell built as part of his joint venture with Small 
Block, whether it was constructed out of some or most of the parts from the bike built 
with Small Block, or whether it was a completely separate bike altogether. Ultimately, 
Mr. Maxwell testified that the bike sold to Mr. Neff was the same bike that had been built 
with Small Block. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.393, Ls.18-24.) However, this testimony does not 
answer the question of whether certain parts may have been swapped out at some 
roint. 
Mr. Neff was unable to title the motorcycle because part of the motor number had 
been gouged out. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.182, L.10 - p.187, L.16.) At trial, Mr. Maxwell 
denied any knowledge of the motor number having been altered or defaced in any way. 
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.365, Ls.4-8.) 
7 
because he needed to pay off the suppliers of the parts he contributed to that bike. 
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.374, L.22 - p.375, L.9, p.393, Ls.21-24.) 
The Witherspoons told a very different story about the motorcycle. 
Mr. Witherspoon testified that, around the time that the bike was titled in their names 
(April 2004 (see Ex.5)), they took possession of it. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.17, L.23 - p.19, L.9.) 
He further testified that they relinquished physical possession back to Mr. Maxwell in 
late May or early June so he could do additional work on it. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, L.10 -
p.20, L.3, p.23, L.21 - p.24, L.11.) However, instead of finishing the bike, 
Mr. Witherspoon claimed after dragging his feet initially, Mr. Maxwell began stripping the 
bike down, leaving them with the feeling that Mr. Maxwell was not going to complete it. 
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.25, L.13 - p.28, L.2.) As a result, around July 5, 2004, the Witherspoons 
tried to get the police involved; however, the police refused to intervene. (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.28, L.12 - p.29, L.10.) 
Regardless of whose version of events is believed, it is undisputed that as the 
parties' relationship deteriorated, but before any motorcycle was sold to Mr. Neff, 
Mr. Maxwell attempted to wind up Von Zipper's business relationship with Small Block. 
In early July, shortly after the Witherspoons presented him with a proposed business 
plan, Mr. Maxwell responded with a letter. In the letter, Mr. Maxwell rejected the 
proposed plan as an attempt to retrospectively alter the original agreement, expressed 
an interest in terminating the joint venture between Von Zippers and Small Block, and 
proposed a split of the assets still held by the joint venture. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.368, L.8 
- p.370, L.7; Ex. Q; Ex. S.) Two days later, the Witherspoons agreed to terminate the 
joint venture but rejected Mr. Maxwell's split of the joint assets; the Witherspoons 
wanted to keep all of the vehicles and simply pay Mr. Maxwell for his work on them. 
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(See Tr. Vol. VI, p.369, L.10 - p.370, L. 7; Ex. T.) As it turned out, these negotiations 
were not fruitful (Tr. Vol. VI, p.369, L.20 - p.370, L.11, p.408, L.20 - p.409, L.2) and the 
parties' relationship went from bad to worse. 9 
On April 7, 2005, the State took the matter to a Kootenai County grand jury, 
seeking indictments for: one count of grand theft (for stealing the motorcycle from the 
Witherspoons); one count of defacing, destroying, or obliterating a vehicle identification 
number (VIN) 10 (on the motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff); and one count of knowingly 
disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a vehicle (the motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff) 
whose VIN had been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.1-9.) Based 
on Mrs. Witherspoon's claim that she and her husband had purchased the motorcycle 
from Mr. Maxwell (see note 4, supra (detailing Mrs. Witherspoon's false testimony in this 
regard)), 11 the grand jury indicted Mr. Maxwell on the grand theft charge. (See R., 13-
14.) In addition, although the only competent evidence presented showed that the 
motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff had a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated motor number, not 
a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated VIN (see Tr. Vol. I, p.75, Ls.7-19, p.76, L.11-p.78, 
9 It appears that it was just a couple days after Mr. Maxwell rejected the Witherspoons' 
proposed business plan that the Witherspoons brought the police to his shop in an effort 
to compel him to turn over the motorcycle to them. (Compare Ex. S (Mr. Maxwell's 
letter, dated July 1, 2004) with Tr. Vol. IV, p.28, L. 12 (Mr. Witherspoon testifying that he 
and his wife brought the police to Mr. Maxwell's shop on "July 5th or something like that, 
about the first week in July").) 
10 It is undisputed that a VIN, which is based on the serial number appearing on the 
frame of the motorcycle, is distinct from a "motor number," which is the serial number 
appearing on the engine of the motorcycle. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.72, L.17 - p.73, L.10 
(Patricia Redel's grand jury testimony); Tr. Vol. VI, p.235, L.25 - p.237, L.3 (Ms. Redel's 
trial testimony).) 
11 Because Mr. Witherspoon did not testify (see generally Tr. Vol. I), and because 
Mrs. Witherspoon never let the grand jury know that she did not have personal 
knowledge of the terms of agreement with regard to the motorcycle (see generally 
Tr. Vol. I, p.6, L.19 - p.44, L.10), the grand jury could not have known that the building 
of the motorcycle was a joint project between Von Zippers and Small Block and, thus, 
the Witherspoons were not the outright owners of that motorcycle. 
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L.5 (testimony of Patricia Redel, a motor vehicle inspector with the Idaho Department of 
Transportation)), 12 the grand jury nevertheless indicted Mr. Maxwell on the other 
charges of defacing, destroying, or obliterating a VIN and disposing of, selling, or 
offering for sale a vehicle whose VIN had been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. (See 
R., pp.14-15.) 
On May 10, 2005, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment 
based on insufficient evidence having been presented to the grand jury. (R., p.22; see 
also R., pp.51-59 (memorandum in support of motion to dismiss).) Mr. Maxwell argued, 
inter alia, that the two counts relating to the supposedly defaced, destroyed, or 
obliterated VIN must be dismissed because the evidence showed only that a motor 
number may have been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated, not the motorcycle VIN. 
(R., p.56.) 
12 Ms. Redel, whose job it is to inspect vehicles (including motorcycles) for purposes of 
titling and registering them (Tr. Vol. I, p.71, L.21 - p.72, L.16), testified that the bike had 
a valid VIN on its frame, and that it did not appear that VIN had been altered in any way 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.75, Ls.16-18, p.76, Ls.13-15); however, she then explained that she 
observed the motor number appeared to have been gouged out (Tr. Vol. I, p.77, L.7 -
p. 78, L.5). Dacia Turner, a police detective with less than four years' experience as a 
police officer (Tr. Vol. I, p.120, L.21 - p.121, L.5), confirmed that the bike had an intact 
VIN on the frame (Tr. Vol. I, p.128, Ls.18-24), and the motor number had been 
scratched out (Tr. Vol. I, p.127, L.21 - p.128, L.4); however, she also testified there was 
a spot on the frame, assuming it had previously borne a sticker with a different, or 
perhaps second VIN on it, that sticker appeared to have been scratched off. ( See 
Tr. Vol. I, p.126, L.20 - p.127, L.15.) Mr. Maxwell submits this last bit of testimony was 
not probative, as it rested on the assumption the bike sold to Mr. Neff had the same 
frame as the bike Von Zippers built with Small Block (see Tr. Vol. I, p.126, L.22 - p.127, 
L.12), but that assumption turned out to be untrue, as the frame on the Neff version of 
the bike was manufactured by Santee Industries (see Tr. Vol. I, p.90, L.11 - p.91, L.4), 
whereas the frame on the Von Zippers/Small Block version of the bike had a serial 
number that was inconsistent with a Santee-manufactured frame (see Tr. Vol. I, p.117, 
Ls.1-11, p.118, L.16 - p.119, L.17). Thus, the State later implicitly conceded that the 
evidence did not show that the VIN had been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated. (See 
R., p.95.) 
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In response, the State implicitly conceded the grand jury testimony supported a 
finding only that the motor number was defaced, destroyed, or obliterated, not the VIN. 
(See R., pp.93-97.) Specifically, it argued it should be allowed to amend the indictment 
to change the allegations (to defacing, destroying, or obliterating a motor number and 
disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a vehicle whose motor number has been 
defaced, destroyed, or obliterated) to conform to the grand jury testimony (R., pp.93-
94). The State also claimed these different factual allegations would still make out the 
"same offenses" under I.C. § 49-1418, the statute under which Mr. Maxwell was 
originally charged (R., p.95). 
In his reply memorandum on this issue, Mr. Maxwell objected to any amendment 
of the indictment under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e), 13 arguing the proposed amendment, 
although it charged crimes under the same statutory provisions that had originally been 
pied, nevertheless alleged different crimes by alleging different operative facts. 
(R., pp.122-23; see also Tr. Vol. II, p.44, Ls.19-25 (defense counsel's reiteration of this 
argument at the hearing on Mr. Maxwell's motion to dismiss).) 
Ultimately, the district court concluded "[t]he Indictment is clearly wrong" (Tr. Vol. 
II, p.51, Ls.14-15), but it found because the different acts alleged in the State's 
proposed amended indictment would not charge a different offense, the State could file 
an amended indictment. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.49, L.21 - p.52, L.9.) Thus, on March 24, 2006, 
the State filed a Second Amended lndictment14 alleging that Mr. Maxwell had defaced, 
13 Under Rule 7, the State may be permitted to amend a complaint, information, or 
indictment "at any time before the prosecution rests if no additional or different offense 
is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." I.C.R. 7(e) 
~emphasis added). 
4 Although entitled a Second Amended Indictment, this was actually the only amended 
indictment actually filed. (See generally R.) The State had apparently prepared an 
amended indictment for purposes of the March 21, 2006 hearing on Mr. Maxwell's 
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destroyed, or obliterated a motor number, and that he had knowingly disposed of, sold, 
or offered for sale a vehicle whose motor number had been defaced, destroyed, or 
obliterated. (R., pp.128-30.) 
On January 16, 2007, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion to dismiss the Second 
Amended Indictment. (R., p.168; see also R., pp.170-75 (memorandum in support of 
motion to dismiss).) He argued that the Second Amended Indictment was inadequate 
under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions because, in Counts II & 111 (the 
two counts revolving around the alleged defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the 
motor number), it alleged different crimes than those that had been passed upon by the 
grand jury. (R., pp.170-75.) Specifically, he argued that the facts alleged in the original 
charging document, not the designation of the offense, define the crime and, therefore, 
when the State amended the indictment to allege different operative facts, even though 
the State continued to allege violations of the same statutory provisions, it nevertheless 
charged different offenses. (R., pp.173-74.) 
On March 20, 2007, the district court entered a written order denying 
Mr. Maxwell's motion. (R., pp.215-16.) The district court offered three reasons therefor. 
First, it reasoned that Mr. Maxwell's motion presented "the same issues by a different 
defense attorney to a different district judge . . . . The issues have already been 
properly decided." (R., p.215.) Second, it found that Mr. Maxwell's motion was 
"procedurally tardy" under Idaho Criminal Rule 12. (R., pp.215, 216.) Third, it 
motion to dismiss; however, it did not file that original amended indictment because the 
district court requested additional changes (narrowing the time frame alleged in Count 
Ill (selling or offering for sale a vehicle with a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated motor 
number)). (See Tr. Vol. 11, p.52, L.10 - p.54, L.10.) The district court then requested 
the State simply file one amended indictment reflecting all of the appropriate changes 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.54, Ls.21-25), and the State did that; however, it still called it a "second" 
amended indictment. 
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concluded that, under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e), the motion was "without substantive 
merit because no new offense is charged [in the Second Amended Indictment] and the 
defendant has not shown any prejudice." (R., p.216.) 
Mr. Maxwell's four-day trial began on April 9, 2007. (See generally R., pp.219-
311.) At trial, Mr. Witherspoon testified that the agreement between Von Zippers and 
Small Block was for the two of them to construct a motorcycle and split the profits from 
the sale of that bike. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15.) He further 
testified as to the $5,000 loan made to Mr. Maxwell, and the fact the loan was only 
tangentially related to the motorcycle. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.4, p.15, L.21 -
p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24.) Mrs. Witherspoon also testified. (See generally 
Tr. Vol. VI, p.47, L.8 - p.164, L.2.) As discussed above, although she attempted to 
characterize the deal regarding the motorcycle as a purchase of the bike (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.53, Ls.19-22, p.55, Ls.5-8, p.84, Ls.3-11 ), she ultimately conceded she was not a 
party to the negotiation of that agreement or the subsequent $5,000 loan. (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.52, Ls.8-17, p.62, Ls.17-19, p.63, Ls.10-13.) 
With regard to the charges concerning the allegedly defaced, destroyed, or 
obliterated motor number, Mr. Neff testified at trial concerning his purchase of a 
motorcycle from Mr. Maxwell (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.172, L.8 - p.174, L.13), his 
unsuccessful attempt to get that motorcycled titled (Tr. Vol. VI, p.186, Ls.7-24), and his 
discovery of the fact that the motor number appeared to have been gouged out (see 
Tr. Vol. VI, p.187, L.15 - p.188, L.6). Ms. Redel testified concerning her own 
observations with regard to the motor number, and explained why she could not provide 
title to Mr. Neff. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.237, L.22 - p.245, L.2.) 
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Finally, Mr. Maxwell exercised his right to testify. He confirmed Mr. Witherspoon's 
testimony with regard to the nature of the agreements concerning the motorcycle (see 
Tr. Vol. VI, p.336, L16 - p.340, L.15, p.357, Ls.19-24, p.373, Ls.11-17, p.401, L.17 -
p.402, L.10) and the $5,000 loan (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.342, L.2 - p.346, L.15). With regard 
to the motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff, Mr. Maxwell denied knowledge of the fact that the 
motor number had been gouged out. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.365, L.4 - 366, L.23.) 
Following the close of the evidentiary portion of Mr. Maxwell's trial, the jury was 
instructed that, on the grand theft charge, one of the elements it had to find (if it was to 
render a guilty verdict on that charge) was that one (or both) of the Witherspoons was 
the "owner" of the motorcycle. (Jury Instruction No. 13.) 15 It was further instructed that 
"[a]n 'owner' of property is any person who has a right of possession of such property 
superior to that of the defendant" (Jury Instruction No. 18); however, it was not told how 
to determine whose right of possession was superior in light of the unique business 
arrangement between Von Zippers and Small Block. (See generally Jury Instructions.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury came back with guilty verdicts on all three 
counts. (R., pp.312-14; Tr. Vol. VI, p.469, L.6 - p.470, L.7.) Ultimately, the district court 
imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, 16 but suspended 
that sentence and placed Mr. Maxwell on probation for seven years. (R., p.338; Tr. Vol. 
II, p.152, L.24 - p.153, L.3, p.153, Ls.13-20.) The district court entered its judgment of 
conviction on August 28, 2007. (R., pp.337-42.) 
15 The jury instructions in this case appear as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. 
16 This aggregate sentence consisted of concurrent sentences of: seven years, with two 
years fixed, for grand theft; and five years, with two years fixed, for each of the two 
counts relating to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motor number in the 
motorcycle sold to Mr. Neff. (R., p.338.) 
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The matter of restitution was handled after Mr. Maxwell was sentenced. 17 
Around October 5, 2005 (which was approximately six months after Mr. Maxwell was 
indicted, but approximately 18 months before his case went to trial), National Indemnity 
Company, the insurance company through which Small Block had insured the 
motorcycle, paid the Witherspoons $15,044.11 for their purported loss. (Affidavit of 
Scott Kepler in Support of Restitution, p.2 & ex.9 (attached to State's July 29 and 
August 5, 2008 Notices of Supporting Documents, which are attached to the motion to 
augment record filed contemporaneously herewith).) Thus, National Indemnity 
Company sought restitution in that amount. (See 2006 PSI addendum, pp.9-11; 2007 
PSI addendum, pp.9-11.) 18 This amount was calculated based on Mrs. Witherspoon's 
representations as to what Small Block had paid toward completion of the motorcycle, 
including the $5,000 (loan) given to Mr. Maxwell, which Mrs. Witherspoon characterized 
as payment on the motorcycle. ( See generally Affidavit of Scott Kepler in Support of 
Restitution; Tr. Vol. VIII, p.66, L.8 - p.74, L.14.) Ultimately, the district court granted 
National Indemnity's full restitution request. 19 ("Amended" Order to Pay Restitution as a 
17 At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted restitution would be ordered, but it 
reserved that matter for a later time. (R., p.339; Tr. Vol. II, p.152, Ls.11-17, p.153, Ls.4-
12, p.154, L.1-p.155, L.17.) 
18 National Indemnity's restitution requests were sometimes made in the name of Able 
Claims Service, Inc. (see, e.g., 2006 PSI addendum, pp.9-11; 2007 PSI addendum, 
pp.9-11 ), the firm hired by National Indemnity to adjust Small Block's claim. (See 
Tr. Vol. VIII, p.66, Ls.16-25.) 
19 The district court also awarded restitution in the amount of $500 to the Witherspoons, 
and $519 to Mr. Neff. ("Amended" Order to Pay Restitution as a Condition of Probation 
(Jan. 27, 2011 ); "Amended" Civil Judgment (Jan. 27, 2011 ).) These amounts are not 
discussed in detail herein because they are not at issue in the present appeal. 
Incidentally, Mr. Neff apparently wound up with the motorcycle. (See R., pp.364-65 
(interim (partial) restitution order requiring, inter a/ia, that Mr. Maxwell and National 
Indemnity execute the documents necessary for relinquishing all claims they might have 
had to ownership in the motorcycle, and that the Idaho Department of Transportation 
issue title in Mr. Neffs name).) 
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Condition of Probation (Jan. 27, 2011) (attached to motion to augment record filed 
contemporaneously herewith); "Amended" Civil Judgment (Jan. 27, 2011) (attached to 
motion to augment record filed contemporaneously herewith); Tr. Vol. VIII, p.94, Ls.6-
11.) 
Mr. Maxwell also filed a motion for a new trial which, although filed prior to his 
sentencing, was briefed, argued, and decided afterward. While Mr. Maxwell is not 
challenging the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial because he is 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on the same basis, it is worth noting the 
basis for that motion: the grand theft conviction cannot stand because the evidence at 
trial showed the Witherspoons did not have a superior possessory right to the 
motorcycle which was actually jointly-owned by Small Block and Von Zippers. 
(R., pp.321-25; Memorandum in Support of l\/1otion for New Trial (Mar. 30, 2010) 
(attached to motion to augment record filed contemporaneously herewith); Tr. Vol. VIII, 
p.49, Ls.12-19). The district court disagreed, concluding there was sufficient evidence 
to support the conviction because the "Witherspoons had full title and possession" of the 
motorcycle, and it therefore denied Mr. Maxwell's motion for a new trial. (Tr. Vol. VIII, 
p.54, Ls.11-24; accord Order (Aug. 27, 2010) (attached to motion to augment record 
filed contemporaneously herewith).) 
In the meantime, Mr. Maxwell filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.345-47.) On 
appeal, Mr. Maxwell asserts three claims of error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to 
support his grand theft conviction; (2) the indictment was improperly amended to allege 
different offenses (related to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motor 
number) than had been considered by the grand jury; and (3) the district court erred in 
its computation of the restitution owed to National Indemnity. 
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ISSUES 
1. Was sufficient evidence offered at Mr. Maxwell's trial to sustain his conviction for 
grand theft? 
2. Did the district court err in allowing the State to amend the indictment to allege 
different offenses than those considered by the grand jury? 





There Was Insufficient Evidence Offered At Trial To Sustain Mr. Maxwell's Conviction 
For Grand Theft 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Maxwell contends that there is insufficient evidence to support his grand theft 
conviction because the State failed to offer substantial, competent evidence as to one of 
the essential elements of that offense-that James and Diana Witherspoon were 
"owners" of the motorcycle he was alleged to have stolen. Specifically, he contends 
that because the term "owner," as used within the theft statute (I.C. § 18-2403(1 )), is 
defined as someone having "a right of possession ... superior to that of the taker, 
obtainer or withholder," I.C. § 18-2402(6) (emphasis added), and the trial evidence 
clearly indicated that Mr. Maxwell had an equal right of possession to the motorcycle he 
is alleged to have stolen, he cannot be said to have committed a theft. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
A criminal conviction may be set aside if the State failed to present substantial, 
competent evidence upon which a rational jury could have found the essential elements 
of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724 
(2007). In determining whether such substantial, competent evidence is present in the 
record, the appellate court will view all facts in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. Id. 
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C. The State Failed To Offer SubstantiaL Competent Evidence Showing That 
Mr. Maxwell Took, Obtained, Or Withheld The Motorcycle From The "Owner' 
In order to obtain a conviction on the grand theft charge in this case, the State 
had to prove the following four essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1) Sherman Maxwell wrongfully took, obtained or withheld property, i.e., a 
specific motorcycle; 
2) He took, obtained or withheld the motorcycle with the intent to deprive 
another of that motorcycle, or to appropriate it for himself or a third person; 
3) The motorcycle was taken, obtained or withheld from its "owner," i.e., one 
or both of the Witherspoons; and 
4) The value of the motorcycle was greater than $1,000. 
See I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), I.C. §§ 18-2407(1)(b)(1). (See also R., pp.128-30 (Second 
Amended Indictment); Jury Instruction No. 13.) With regard to the third of these 
essential elements-the requirement that the motorcycle have been taken, obtained or 
withheld from an "owner"-the term "owner" is defined as "any person who has a right to 
possession [of the motorcycle] superior to that of' Mr. Maxwell. I.C. § 18-2402(6). (See 
also Jury Instruction No.18.) Thus, not only did the State have to prove that 
Mr. Maxwell took, obtained or withheld the motorcycle from the Witherspoons, but it also 
had to prove that the Witherspoons had right of possession of the motorcycle that was 
superior to Mr. Maxwell's. See I.C. § 18-2402(6). Mr. Maxwell contends that the State 
failed in this regard. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently had occasion to discuss the "ownership" 
element of the crime of theft. See State v. Bennett, 150 Idaho 278 (2010). In Bennett, 
the Supreme Court noted the term "owner" is defined in terms of a superior right of 
possession under Idaho's theft statute, but it implicitly recognized determining who has 
19 
a superior right of possession is not always easy, and may even require resort to 
principles more commonly invoked in civil litigation. See id. at 280. The Bennett Court 
examined the facts in view of Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (codified 
at Chapters 2 and 9 of Title 28 of the Idaho Code), and determined the State had failed 
to prove the alleged victim's right of possession was superior to that of the defendant. 20 
Id. 
While the present case is not precisely the same as Bennett, the Bennett opinion 
is nevertheless instructive because it makes it clear where a defendant charged with 
theft based on taking, obtaining, or withholding property from another also has a right of 
possession of that property, other areas of the law must be considered in order to 
determine whose right of possession was superior. For the following reasons, 
Mr. Maxwell contends that his right of possession of the motorcycle at issue in this case 
was at least equal to that of the Witherspoons. 
1. There Is No Competent Evidence To Suggest That Mr. Maxwell Ever Sold 
The Motorcycle To The Witherspoons 
As discussed in the above statement of facts, although Mrs. Witherspoon has, at 
times, claimed that she and her husband purchased the motorcycle from Mr. Maxwell 
her testimony in this regard is demonstrably false. (See note 4, supra.) At trial, she 
20 In Bennett, the defendant had put a down payment (and made at least one additional 
payment) on a travel trailer, the travel trailer was delivered to the defendant (at a third 
party's property), and the State's evidence indicated that the travel trailer was chained 
up (at the third party's property) and not to be moved pending full payment and transfer 
of title. Bennett, 150 Idaho at 278-79. When the defendant moved the trailer, he was 
charged with grand theft. Id. at 279. The Court held under the UCC, the seller of the 
travel trailer no longer had a superior right of possession because he had delivered the 
item sold, and because he had failed to effectuate an enforceable security interest in the 
trailer (which may have given him a superior right of possession in the event of a default 
by the buyer) before the defendant breached the sales contract. 
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conceded that she was not involved in the formation of the agreements with regard to 
either the building of the motorcycle (Tr. Vol. VI, p.52, Ls.8-17, p.63, Ls.10-13) or the 
$5,000 payment that was made to Von Zippers by Witherspoon Homes (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.62, Ls.17-19), so her beliefs as to the terms of those agreements are based on 
nothing more than speculation and, as such, are largely irrelevant. Furthermore, her 
husband and business partner, who she conceded actually negotiated with Mr. Maxwell, 
clearly and unequivocally testified the agreement was for Von Zippers to contribute 
certain parts, Small Block to purchase the rest of the necessary parts, Von Zippers to 
build the bike, and Von Zippers and Small Block to sell the bike and split the profits 
50/50 (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15), while the agreement with 
regard to the $5,000 payment was a separate loan (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.4, 
p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24). Clearly these agreements were not 
contracts for a sale of a motorcycle. Accordingly, is no surprise the State has since 
conceded the Witherspoons did not have a superior right of possession based on a 
purchase of the motorcycle. (See State's Response to Defendant's Motion for New 
Trial and Supporting Brief, pp.4-6 (May 6, 2010).) 
2. Insofar As The Motorcycle Was Titled In The Names Of The Witherspoons 
And/Or Small Block, That Fact Would Not Be Dispositive Of The Question 
Of Who The "Owner" Of The Motorcycle Was For Purposes Of Idaho's 
Theft Statute 
At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether the Witherspoons and/or 
Small Block held valid title to the motorcycle. (Compare Tr. Vol. IV, p.17, L.23 - p.18, 
L.25, p.20, Ls.4-13, p.38, Ls.4-18 (Mr. Witherspoon claiming that Mr. Maxwell voluntarily 
signed a bill of sale, as well as a certificate of title, so that the motorcycle could be titled 
in the Witherspoons' names) and Tr. Vol. VI., p.32, L.9 - p.33, L.9, p.35, Ls.1-22, p.37, 
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L.19 - p.38, L.17, p.39, L.6 - p.40, L.9 (same) with Tr. Vol. VI, p.357, Ls.7-24, p.358, 
Ls.19-23, p.364, Ls.4-13 (Mr. Maxwell denying that he ever signed a bill of sale or 
certificate of title to have the motorcycle titled in the Witherspoons' names, and 
hypothesizing that the Witherspoons forged the documents necessary to title the 
motorcycles in their names).) 
Assuming the State's evidence (Mr. Witherspoon's testimony) is true, 21 the title 
alone is not dispositive. In Bennett, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
title controls. There, the Court held the purchaser of a travel trailer had a superior right 
of possession and, thus, was the "owner," of that trailer for purposes of Idaho's theft 
statute even though the seller had retained title. See Bennett, 150 Idaho at 278-79. 22 
As noted above, the Court looked solely to the Uniform Commercial Code to determine 
who the owner of the travel trailer was. 23 See id. at 280. Thus, in this case, the 
question is not simply whether the Witherspoons or Small Block could come forward 
with title documents for the motorcycle but whether, under Idaho law, they actually had 
a superior right of possession. For the reasons set forth in the following subsection, 
Mr. Maxwell contends that they did not. 
21 As noted above, in the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this 
Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the State. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
at 724. 
22 Cf. Murgoitio v. Murgoitio, 111 Idaho 573, 576-77 (1986) (affirming a district court's 
conclusion that parcels of real property were all owned by a family partnership, even 
though title to individual parcels was, at least in some instances, in the names of the 
individual family members/ partners). 
23 Notably, Justice J. Jones, who wrote separately, indicated that he would have had 
decided the case based on the titling provisions of the motor vehicle code, not the UCC. 
Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280{ TA \s "Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280" } (Jones, J., concurring). 
However, this approach clearly was not embraced by a majority of the Court. See id. at 
278-79. 
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3. The Evidence In This Case Establishes Von Zippers And Small Block Had 
Equal Rights Of Possession To The Motorcycle 
As discussed above, Von Zippers and Small Block entered into an agreement 
under which they planned to: purchase damaged vehicles, repair or refurbish those 
vehicles, and re-sell those vehicles at a profit, splitting the proceeds 50/50. (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.131, L.2 - p.138, L.24, p.336, Ls.16-21, p.340, Ls.7-12.) The agreement called for 
Small Block to supply the necessary funds, and Von Zippers the necessary expertise 
and labor. (See Tr. VoL VI, p.131, L.2 - p.138, L.24, p.336, Ls.16-21, p.340, Ls.7-12.) 
As a slight variation on this broader agreement, at some point they also agreed to build 
a custom motorcycle from the ground up. (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9, L.6.) Again, 
the plan was for Small Block to provide the bulk of the funding (although, in this 
instance, Von Zippers would contribute certain parts), Von Zippers to supply the know-
how and labor, and the parties to split the profits 50/50. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9, 
L.6.) 
Regardless of whether this business relationship is characterized as a joint 
venture or a partnership, Mr. Maxwell contends the result is that, under Idaho law, he 
and the Witherspoons had equal rights of possession of the motorcycle that was 
created through their joint effort and expense. Below, Mr. Maxwell explains why that is 
so. 
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a) Assuming Von Zippers And Small Block Manufactured The 
Motorcycle As Part Of A Partnership, They Had Equal Rights Of 
Possession Of That Motorcycle 
A partnership is an "association of two (2) or more persons24 to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit," and it may be formed regardless of the intent of the 
parties. I.C. § 53-3-202(a). This definition would seem to fit the business relationship 
between Von Zippers and Small Block. There were two parties involved; they 
associated with one another; and they did so for the purpose of turning a profit. The 
only question is whether they "carr[ied] on as co-owners of a business."25 Certainly Von 
Zippers and Small Block carried on as co-owners of a business involved in repairing / 
refurbishing (and selling for a profit) all manner of vehicles; however, the motorcycle 
project was somewhat unique in that Von Zippers and Small Block were building the 
motorcycle from the ground up. Nevertheless, because the motorcycle project was so 
similar in nature to the other projects undertaken by the Von Zippers/Small Block 
partnership, it is probably most reasonably construed as part of that partnership. 
Partnerships in Idaho are governed by the Uniform Partnership Act, 
I.C. § 53-3-101 et seq. Under that Act, when property is transferred to the partnership, 
it becomes partnership property. See I.C. § 53-3-204. Thus, when Von Zippers and 
Small Block contributed parts clearly intended to be used in the motorcycle, those parts 
24 A "person," as defined by Idaho's Uniform Partnership Law, includes not only natural 
persons, but also corporations, business trusts, estates, trusts, partnerships, limited 
partnerships, associations, joint ventures, limited liability companies, governments, 
governmental subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, or any other legal or 
commercial entities. I.C. § 53-3-101 (12). 
25 If, instead, Von Zippers' and Small Block's relationship was limited to a "single 
business enterprise," that relationship would best be described as a joint venture. 
Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356 (2008); Steams v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 285 
(1952). 
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became the property of the partnership; as a result, the finished product-the completed 
(or partially completed), motorcycle-was the property of the partnership as well. Cf 
Murgoitio v. Murgoitio, 111 Idaho 573, 576 (1986) (holding, under an older version of 
the Uniform Partnership Law, that "the ultimate determination of whether an asset is 
partnership property depends on the parties' intent"). 
Under Idaho law, the partnership is an entity unto itself, I.C. § 53-3-201 (a), and 
any property of the partnership "is the property of the partnership and not the partners 
individually." I.C. § 53-3-203. However, because each partner is an agent of 
partnership and generally has an equal ability to conduct the business of the partnership 
on its behalf, I.C. §§ 53-3-301 & -401 (f), each partner is entitled to "use or possess 
partnership property ... on behalf of the partnership." I.C. § 53-3-4-1 (g). In this case, 
since the purpose of the partnership to prepare various vehicles for sale (or re-sale) at a 
profit, Mr. Maxwell had just as much right to possess and/or sell the motorcycle as did 
the Witherspoons. Accordingly, neither the Witherspoons, nor Small Block, had a right 
of possession to the motorcycle that was superior to Mr. Maxwell's. As such, neither 
the Witherspoons, nor Small Block, was the "owner" of the motorcycle for purposes of 
Idaho's theft statute and, therefore, Mr. Maxwell's conviction for grand theft must be 
reversed. 
b) Assuming Von Zippers And Small Block Manufactured The 
Motorcycle As Part Of A Joint Venture, They Had Equal Rights Of 
Possession Of That Motorcycle 
"A joint venture is generally a relationship analogous to but not identical with a 
partnership .... " Steams v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 285 (1952) (quoted in Costa v. 
Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356 (2008)). The most important distinction between a 
partnership and a joint venture appears to be its scope. Whereas a partnership is an 
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"association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit," 
I.C. § 53-3-202(a) (emphasis added), a joint venture "is often described as an 
association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise with the 
objective of realizing a profit." Stearns, 72 Idaho at 285 (quoted in Borges, 145 Idaho at 
356) (emphasis added). As noted above, the business relationship between Von 
Zippers and Small Block was conceived as an ongoing relationship, consisting of 
numerous projects involving all different manner of vehicles. As such, Mr. Maxwell 
asserts that it is best described as a partnership. However, to the extent that this Court 
disagrees, or is inclined to treat the motorcycle project as a separate business 
relationship, the relationship would then be best described as a joint venture.26 
In a joint venture, the business relationship is "'not an entity separate and apart 
from the parties composing it."' Borges, 145 Idaho at 357 (quoting Clawson v. General 
Ins. Co. of America, 90 Idaho 424, 431 (1966)). Thus, rather than the business entity 
possessing the property of the business, participants in a joint venture share "a joint 
property interest in the subject matter of the venture .... " Rhodes, 113 Idaho at 166. 
In other words, "[i]t is immaterial whose name the property is acquired in a joint venture, 
as one holding title is a trustee for those who are so engaged in the joint venture." Id. 
26 In Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho 162 (1987), the Idaho Supreme Court 
identified five characteristics of a joint venture: 
(1) a contribution by the parties of money, property, effort, knowledge, 
skill, or other assets to a common undertaking; 
(2) a joint property interest in the subject matter of the venture and a 
right of mutual control or management of the enterprise; 
(3) expectation of profits, or the presence of a venture; 
(4) a right to participate in the profits; and 
(5) a limitation of the objective to a single undertaking or ad hoc 
enterprise. 
Id. at 165-66. The Court held that "[a) joint venture is created when" all five 
characteristics are present. Id. 
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In this case, where Von Zippers and Small Block built a motorcycle together, both 
parties shared an equal property interest in that motorcycle. 
Furthermore, just as with a partnership, the participants in a joint venture share 
"mutual control or management of the enterprise .... " Id. Accordingly, Mr. Maxwell 
contends his right to possess, or even sell, the motorcycle in furtherance of the joint 
venture was equal to that of the Witherspoons (Small Block). Thus, neither the 
Witherspoons, nor Small Block, was the "owner" of the motorcycle for purposes of 
Idaho's theft statute and, therefore, Mr. Maxwell's conviction for grand theft must be 
reversed. 
4. The Witherspoons Were Not "Owners" Of The Motorcycle By Virtue Of 
Any Sort Of Security Interest In That Motorcycle 
At trial, Mr. Witherspoon testified Mr. Maxwell signed title to the motorcycle over 
to the Witherspoons (Tr. Vol. IV, p.18, Ls.3-10; Tr. Vol. VI, p.35, Ls.1-19, p.39, L.21 -
p.40, L.9), and the Witherspoons eventually took possession of the bike (Tr. Vol. IV, 
p.18, L.16 - p.19, L. 19, L.9; Tr. Vol. VI, p.39, Ls.6-20, p.42, Ls.8-22). Mr. Witherspoon 
further testified the intent was to have the motorcycle serve as collateral for the $5,000 
loan the Witherspoons had made to Mr. Maxwell (see Tr. Vol. IV, p.20, Ls.2-13; Tr. Vol. 
VI, p.33, L.10 - p.35, L.19, p.38, Ls.1-17),27 as well as certain other unspecified 
transactions (Tr. Vol. VI, p.43, L.6 - p.44, L.4). However, neither the promissory note 
27 While Mr. Maxwell recognizes that the applicable standard of review requires that the 
State's evidence be believed, the reality is that Mr. Witherspoon's claim that the 
motorcycle was to have secured the $5,000 loan is highly suspect. The title to the 
motorcycle transfer was supposedly transferred sometime around April 30, 2004; 
however, the $5,000 loan was not made until more than two weeks later-around 
May 17, 2004. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.42, L.8 - p.43, L.4.) It seems highly improbable that 
title to the motorcycle was transferred to the Witherspoons in order secure a non-
existent loan. 
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on that loan, nor the Witherspoons' demand on the note, made any reference to any 
motorcycle. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.38, L.22 - p.40, L.5; Ex. F; Ex. U.) Furthermore, at some 
point, Mr. Witherspoon returned the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell because "it still needed a 
few things." (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, L.10-p.20, L.7, p.23, L.21-p.23, L.12.) 
Idaho law is not entirely clear on the question of whether a creditor in a secured 
transaction becomes the "owner" of the collateral (for purposes of Idaho's theft statute) 
immediately upon the debtor's default. In State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638 (Ct. App. 
1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this very issue, ultimately rejecting the 
notion that a secured creditor becomes the "owner" of property under the theft statute, 
such that the debtor can be charged with a crime immediately upon his breach of 
contract. In Henninger, the defendant breached a secured installment contract for 
purchase of an automobile by failing to pay for that automobile. See id. at 639-40. The 
Court, in evaluating the language of Idaho's theft statute, declined to interpret sections 
18-2402(6) and 18-2403(3) as conferring the status of "owner" upon the secured 
creditor. See id. at 641-642. In part, the Court reasoned as follows: 
It may be legitimately argued that under this definition [of the term 
"owner" in section 18-2402(6)], a party who holds only a security interest 
becomes the "owner" of the goods upon the debtor's default because the 
default gives the secured party the right of possession superior to that of 
the purchaser. We think it unlikely, however, that the Idaho legislature, in 
adopting I.C. §§ 18-2402(6) and 18-2403(3), intended to render criminal 
the conduct of every person who misses· a payment on a secured credit 
purchase and does not immediately comply with a contractual obligation to 
relinquish possession of the collateral to the secured seller. 
Our conclusion that the legislature did not intend the retention of 
collateral after default on a secured obligation to constitute theft by 
unauthorized control is also based upon the traditional separation between 
criminal law and contract law. Our Supreme Court observed in State v. 
Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 50, 501 P.2d 727, 734 (1972), that there has been an 
"evolved tradition against enforcing contractual obligations through the 
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criminal law.". . . Without a more explicit expression of intent by the 
legislature to abandon this customary separation of criminal law from civil 
contract enforcement, we will not conclude that the legislature intended 
unauthorized control under I .C. § 18-2403(3) to encompass possession by 
a debtor who, by defaulting on a payment, has become contractually 
obligated to return the collateral to the creditor, or that the legislature 
intended the theft statute to be a mechanism that would aid the 
repossession efforts of secured creditors. 
Id. at 867-68. Indeed, to construe Idaho's theft statute as allowing criminal prosecution 
for a breach of contract (in the absence of a fraud element) would run afoul of Article I, 
Section 15 of the Idaho Constitution, which holds that "[t]here shall be no imprisonment 
for debt in this state except in cases of fraud." "This provision is intended to prohibit 
imprisonment over disputes which are contractual in nature." State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 
920, 928 (Ct. App. 1997). Accordingly, it is Mr. Maxwell's contention that secured 
creditors are not "owners" for purposes of Idaho's theft statute. Thus, even if the 
Witherspoons or Small Block had an enforceable security interest in the motorcycle, 
Mr. Maxwell could not have been convicted of theft based on his default.28 
However, Mr. Maxwell is not unmindful of the fact that in dicta in State v. Bennett, 
supra, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that a retained security interest in delivered 
goods "would give the seller a superior possessory right in the property upon the 
buyer's default," so as to make the seller the "owner" of the goods for purposes of 
Idaho's theft statute.29 Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280. Assuming that this portion of Bennett 
28 A far more reasonable interpretation of Idaho's theft statute is that the secured 
creditor only becomes the "owner" of the collateral upon the debtor's default and the 
creditor's valid physical possession of the collateral. Under this interpretation, the 
breach of contract itself would not incur criminal penalties, only a subsequent taking of 
the collateral from the secured creditor. 
29 This portion of Bennett contains no analysis of the language of, or intent behind, 
section 18-2402(6), and it makes no mention of the Court of Appeals' Henninger 
opinion. See Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280. As noted, it is also dicta because the 
Supreme Court that the seller had no enforceable security interest. See id. 
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overruled Henninger, the State still failed to offer sufficient evidence of theft because 
neither the Witherspoons nor Small Block held an enforceable security interest in the 
motorcycle. 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (codified at J.C. § 28-9-101 et 
seq.), title is irrelevant to the question of whether the Witherspoons or Small Block 
retained a security interest in the motorcycle. I.C. § 28-9-202. The standard is whether: 
(a) the collateral [was] in the possession of the secured party pursuant 
to agreement ... or the debtor has signed a security agreement 
which contains a description of the collateral ... ; and 
(b) value has been given; and 
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral. 
I.C. § 28-9-203(1). Under this standard, it is clear the Witherspoons /Small Block did 
not have a security interest in the motorcycle because the State failed to offer sufficient 
proof as to part (a) of the test. First, it clear no security agreement was ever entered 
containing a description of the collateral. Indeed, as noted, neither the promissory note 
for the $5,000 loan, nor the demand for payment on that note, included any reference to 
collateral, much less collateral consisting of the motorcycle in question. (Tr. Vol. IV, 
p.38, L.22 - p.40, L.5; Ex. F; Ex. U.) Second, although Mr. Witherspoon claimed to 
have had possession of the motorcycle for a short period of time, he conceded that he 
voluntarily relinquished possession of the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell prior to 
Mr. Maxwell's default on the $5,000 loan. (Compare Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, L.10 - p.20, L.7 
(Mr. Witherspoon testifying he returned the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell in early June of 
2004) and Tr. Vol. IV, p.23, L.21 - p.23, L.12 (Mr. Witherspoon testifying he returned 
the motorcycle to Mr. Maxwell in late May or early June of 2004) with Ex F (promissory 
note for the $5,000 loan indicating that "[t]his note shall be due on demand, or if no 
30 
demand is made, one year after the date of making the note") and Ex. U (Witherspoon 
Homes' July 13, 2004 demand for payment on the note, giving Mr. Maxwell fifteen days 
to make the $5,000 payment). Since the Witherspoons were not in possession of the 
alleged collateral, and there was no written agreement describing the collateral, the 
Witherspoons had no enforceable security interest in the motorcycle. I.C. § 28-9-
203(1 ). 
D. Conclusion 
Because the State failed to offer substantial, competent evidence establishing 
that either the Witherspoons or Small Block was the "owner" of the motorcycle, there is 
insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Maxwell's grand theft conviction. Accordingly, 
Mr. Maxwell asks this Court to reverse his conviction. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Amend The Indictment To Allege 
Different Offenses Than Those Considered By The Grand Jury 
A. Introduction 
As discussed in detail in the Statement of Facts, the State sought to indict 
Mr. Maxwell not only on one count of grand theft, but also on two counts relating to the 
alleged defacement, destruction or obliteration of a motorcycle VIN. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, 
Ls.1-9.) However, the evidence presented to the grand jury showed only that the 
motorcycle's motor number, not its VIN, had been defaced, destroyed or obliterated. 
(See Tr. Vol. I, p.75, Ls.7-19, p.76, L.11 - p.78, L.5.) Nevertheless, the grand jury 
indicted Mr. Maxwell on the two counts relating to the alleged defacement, destruction 
or obliteration of the VIN. (See R., pp.14-15.) 
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As noted, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment based 
on insufficient evidence of a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated VIN having been 
presented to the grand jury. (R., p.22; see also R., pp.51-59 (memorandum in support 
of motion to dismiss).) In response, the State implicitly conceded the grand jury 
testimony supported a finding only that the motor number-not the VIN-was defaced, 
destroyed, or obliterated. (See R., pp.93-97.) It then argued that it should be allowed to 
amend the indictment-to allege a defaced, destroyed or obliterated motor number 
instead of a defaced, destroyed, or obliterated VIN-so that the indictment might 
conform to the grand jury testimony. (R., pp.93-94.) Part of this argument was the 
State's contention the different factual allegations would still make out the "same 
offenses" under I.C. § 49-1418, the statute under which Mr. Maxwell was originally 
charged. (R., p.95.) 
Mr. Maxwell objected to any amendment of the indictment, arguing the proposed 
amendment violated both Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) and principles of due process, the 
amended indictment charged violations of the same statutory provisions as the original 
indictment, it actually alleged different offenses because it alleged different operative 
facts. (R., pp.122-23; Tr. Vol. II, p.44, Ls.19-25.) Ultimately, although the district court 
concluded "[t]he Indictment is clearly wrong" (Tr. Vol. II, p.51, Ls.14-15), it ruled the 
different acts alleged in the State's proposed amended indictment would not charge a 
different offense, therefore, the district court found the amendment was permissible and 
granted the State leave to file the amended indictment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.49, L.21 - p.52, 
L.9.) On March 24, 2006, the State filed its Second Amended Indictment asserting two 
counts relating to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of a motor number, as 
opposed to a VIN. (R., pp.128-30.) 
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Subsequently, Mr. Maxwell filed a motion to dismiss the amended indictment on 
the basis that the indictment was inadequate under both the Idaho and United States 
Constitutions because, in Counts II & Ill (the two counts concerning the alleged 
defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motor number), it alleged different crimes 
than those that had been passed upon by the grand jury. (R., pp.168, 170-75.) 
Specifically, he argued the facts alleged in the original charging document, not the 
designation of the offense, define the crime and, therefore, when the State amended the 
indictment to allege different operative facts, even though the State continued to allege 
violations of the same statutory provisions, it nevertheless charged different offenses. 
(R., pp.173-74.) 
On March 20, 2007, the district court denied Mr. Maxwell's motion. (R., pp.215-
16.) It reasoned that Mr. Maxwell's arguments had already been rejected; his motion 
was untimely under Idaho Criminal Rule 12; and, under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e), the 
motion was "without substantive merit because no new offense is charged [in the 
Second Amended Indictment] and the defendant has not shown any prejudice." 
(R., pp.215-16.) 
Mr. Maxwell submits that the district court erred in allowing the State to amend 
the indictment in the first place. Because the amended indictment alleged different 
criminal acts, it alleged different offenses. Thus, amendment was not only improper 
under I.C.R. 7(e), but it violated Mr. Maxwell's right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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B. The Amended Indictment Charged Different Offenses Than Those Considered 
By The Grand Jury 
The original indictment handed down by the grand jury alleged two crimes related 
to the defacement, destruction, or obliteration of a motorcycle VIN. (R., pp.13-15.) 
Count II alleged that Mr. Maxwell "did deface and/or destroy and/or obliterate a motor 
vehicle identification number on a 2003 Renegade custom motorcycle vehicle 
identification number 1V9HC26573C 109012, by grinding, sanding, or otherwise 
removing the vehicle identification," in violation of I.C. § 49-1418 (3). (R., pp.13-14 
(emphasis added).) Count Ill alleged that Mr. Maxwell "did knowingly dispose of and/or 
sell and/or offer for sale a 2003 Renegade custom motorcycle from which the vehicle 
identification number had been defaced and/or destroyed and/or obliterated," in violation 
of I.C. § 49-1418(4). (R., pp.13-15 (emphasis added).) As noted, it is undisputed that 
the vehicle identification number is the serial number appearing on the frame of the 
motorcycle. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.72, L.17 - p.73, L.10 (Patricia Redel's grand jury 
testimony); Tr. Vol. VI, p.235, L.25 - p.237, L.3 (Ms. Redel's trial testimony).) 
The amended indictment, in contrast, alleged two crimes related to the 
defacement, destruction, or obliteration of the motorcycle's motor number. Count II 
alleged Mr. Maxwell "did deface and/or destroy, a motor number, manufacturer's 
number, or parts number, on a motor or engine of a 2003 custom motorcycle," in 
violation of I.C. § 49-1418 (3). (R., pp.128-29.) Count Ill alleged Mr. Maxwell "did 
knowingly dispose of, and/or sell, and/or offer for sale, a Renegade custom motorcycle 
from which the motor or engine number had been defaced, and/or destroyed, and or 
obliterated," in violation of I.C. § 49-1418(4). (R., pp.128-30.) Obviously, a motor 
number appears on the motor (engine) of a motorcycle, not the frame. 
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Although the acts alleged in Count II of the original indictment (defacing, 
destroying, or obliterating a VIN) versus Count II of the amended indictment (defacing, 
destroying, or obliterating a motor number), and the acts alleged in Count Ill of the 
original indictment (disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a motorcycle whose VIN has 
been defaced, destroyed, or obliterated) versus Count Ill of the amended indictment 
(disposing of, selling, or offering for sale a motorcycle whose motor number has been 
defaced, destroyed, or obliterated), are made criminal by the same subsections 
(subsections (3) and (4), respectively) of I.C. § 49-1418, the acts themselves define the 
crime charged, not the designation of the offense or the statute cited. 
In State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, 150 P. 39 (1915), the earliest reported case on 
this subject, the Supreme Court held that where the charging document alleged all of 
the pertinent facts which, if proven, would satisfy the elements of involuntary 
manslaughter, it did not matter that the State had failed to specifically allege the 
defendant had committed "involuntary manslaughter." Id. at_, 150 P. at 40. The 
Supreme Court reasoned that "(t]he facts alleged, rather than the designation of the 
offense, control." Id. 
The reasoning of Mickey has withstood the test of time. ln 1967, the Supreme 
Court followed Mickey in holding it was permissible for the State to amend a charging 
document (that had initially identified the offense as aggravated assault) to reflect a 
greater charge (aggravated battery) because the acts alleged had not changed. 
State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 817-18 (1967). More recently, in 1990, the Supreme 
Court applied the standard articulated in Mickey and McKeehan in holding that a 
charging document could be amended to allege sexual abuse of a minor, instead of 
lewd conduct with a minor, in part, because "(t]he acts comprising a violation of I.C. § 
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18-1506 [lewd conduct] as set forth and alleged in the Amended Information are the 
same acts with which O'Neill was charged in the original Complaint and original 
Information alleging violation of I.C. § 18-1508 [sexual abuse]." State v. O'Neill, 118 
Idaho 244, 249 (1990). 
In view of these authorities, it is readily apparent that Counts II and Ill of the 
amended indictment in this case charged different offenses than Counts II and Ill of the 
original indictment because they alleged different criminal acts.30 
C. Because The Amended Indictment Charged Different Offenses Than Had Been 
Considered By The Grand Jury, The State Had No Ability To Proceed On That 
Amended Indictment And Mr. Maxwell's Convictions On Counts II And Ill Must 
Be Vacated 
Because the original indictment in this case was amended to allege different 
offenses (in Counts II & Ill) than had been considered by the grand jury, the amendment 
was improper under both the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. See 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) ("Because the amended indictment did 
not charge Severson with a new offense or result in prejudice, the amendment was 
permissible under principles of due process and Rule 7(e)."); I.C.R. 7(e) ("The court 
30 This is not a case where the amendment to the charging document changed only the 
manner or means by which the criminal act was alleged to have been done-for 
example, where the charging document is amended to allege "statutory" rape, instead of 
forcible rape, against the same victim. In that instance, it has been held that the 
amendment goes not to the act alleged (nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a 
specified victim), but to the "circumstances" under which the act was allegedly 
undertaken. See State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1987). In this case, the act 
alleged differed between the original indictment and the amended indictment. In the 
former case, Mr. Maxwell was alleged to have defaced, destroyed, or obliterated a VIN, 
and in the latter case, Mr. Maxwell was alleged to have defaced, destroyed, or 
obliterated a motor number. Analogizing this case to the rape example, it is as if the 
charging document were amended to allege the rape of a different victim. Surely that 
would be an allegation of a different offense. 
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may permit a complaint, an information or indictment to be amended at any time before 
the prosecution rests if no additional or different offense is charged .... "). 31 
As noted, when the State moved to amend the indictment, Mr. Maxwell objected 
to any amendment, citing I.C.R. 7(e) and his right to due process, and arguing the 
State's proffered amendment would charge different offenses than those considered by 
the grand jury. (R., p.123; Tr. Vol. II, p.42, L.13 - p.48, L.13, p.51, Ls.20-24.) The 
district court overruled that objection and allowed the State to file its amended 
indictment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.49, L.21 - p.52, L.9.) This was error. 
First, while Rule 7(e) is, in many ways, quite liberal in allowing the district court to 
grant leave for the State to amend a charging document, it articulates two situations in 
which amendment is expressly disallowed: (a) where the amendment will prejudice the 
defendant; and (b) where the amendment would charge an "additional or different 
offense." I.C.R. 7(e). Furthermore, it is now reasonably clear that an amendment which 
prejudices the defendant or charges and additional or different offense runs afoul of the 
due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 
710. Second, for the reasons discussed in Part 11(8) (and incorporated herein by this 
31 Although Article I Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution was not explicitly mentioned in 
Mr. Maxwell's initial objection to the State's request to amend the indictment, it is clear 
that Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) is intended to give effect to the rights guaranteed therein. 
See State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 30 (Ct. App. 2009). Article I Section 8 guarantees, 
inter a/ia, that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of 
any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on information of the 
public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate," IDAHO CONST. art. 1 § 8, and the 
standard for finding a violation of this right to a grand jury proceeding or preliminary 
hearing based on an improper amendment of the indictment or information is the same 
standard as for finding a violation of Rule 7(e). See McKeehan, 91 Idaho at 817 ("An 
accused is denied ... his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing [under Article I 
Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution] where an information is filed or subsequently 
amended charging him with a crime of a greater degree or of a different nature than that 
for which he was held by the committing magistrate."). 
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reference), it is clear the State's amended indictment charged different offenses than 
those considered by the grand jury. 
In light of the foregoing, it was error for the district court to have allowed the 
amendment. See I.C.R. 7(e); Severson, 147 Idaho at 710. As a result, Mr. Maxwell's 
convictions on Counts II and Ill should be vacated, and this Court should remand his 
case with an instruction that Counts II and Ill be dismissed. 
111. 
The District Court Erred In Its Computation Of The Restitution Owed To National 
Indemnity 
A. Introduction 
In Part I, supra, Mr. Maxwell argued that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to support his grand theft conviction and, therefore, that conviction must be 
reversed. Assuming this Court agrees, it should also vacate the restitution awards 
arising out of Mr. Maxwell's alleged theft of the motorcycle-$500 for the Witherspoons 
and $15,044.11 for National Indemnity. 
In the event this Court finds sufficient evidence to affirm his grand theft 
conviction, Mr. Maxwell presents an alternative argument. He asserts the district court 
erred in its computation of the restitution owed to National Indemnity based on the theft 
of the motorcycle. Specifically, Mr. Maxwell contends that the $15,044.11 restitution 
award was incorrect because it included a $5,000 loss that was in no way attributable to 
Mr. Maxwell's criminal conduct. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
"A criminal trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction or authority to order 
restitution unless provided by statute." State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 760 (Ct. App. 
2010). Idaho law, however, generally provides such jurisdiction/authority. A district 
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court may, in a criminal case, "order a defendant found guilty of any crime which 
results32 in an economic loss33 to the victim34 to make restitution to the victim." 
I.C. § 19-5304 (2). 
The question of whether restitution is warranted lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 942 (Ct. App. 1997). The district 
court's determination of whether to order restitution in a particular case is reviewed by 
the appellate court for an abuse of discretion. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 
(Ct. App. 2002). As with all exercises of the district court's discretion, the court's 
decision to award restitution must be made through an exercise of reason and, further, 
must be consistent with any applicable legal standards. Id. 
"The court, in determining ... the amount of such restitution, shall consider the 
amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial 
resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the 
court deems appropriate." I.C. § 19-5304 (7). Economic loss must be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-5304(6). The amount of economic loss is a 
question of fact for the district court, and it will not be disturbed on appeal if it is 
32 In State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602-06, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear 
the inquiry is whether the defendant's criminal conduct was both the actual cause, as 
well as the proximate cause, of the economic loss suffered. 
33 '"Economic loss' includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, 
such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct, but does not include less 
tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress." 
I.C. § 19-5304 (1 )(a). 
34 A "victim" is defined to include "[t]he directly injured victim which means a person or 
entity who suffers economic loss or injury as a result of the defendant's criminal 
conduct," as well as "[a] person or entity who suffers economic loss because such 
person or entity has made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant 
to a contract including, but not limited to, an insurance contract .... " I.C. § 19-5304 
(1)(e). Mr. Maxwell concedes that National Indemnity is a "victim" within the meaning of 
1.C. § 19-5304(2). 
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supported by substantial evidence. State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 544 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Otherwise, the restitution amount lies within the discretion of the district court. State v. 
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, _, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011 ). As noted, in order to not 
constitute an abuse of discretion, the district court's restitution decision must be made 
through an exercise of reason and must be consistent with any applicable legal 
standards. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37. 
C. The Restitution Award For National Indemnity Was Calculated Incorrectly 
National Indemnity Company, the insurance company through which Small Block 
had insured the motorcycle at issue in this case, paid the Witherspoons $15,044.11 for 
their purported loss of that motorcycle. (Affidavit of Scott Kepler in Support of 
Restitution, p.2 & ex.9.) Thus, National Indemnity sought restitution in that amount. 
(See 2006 PSI addendum, pp.9-11; 2007 PSI addendum, pp.9-11.) 
This amount was calculated based on Mrs. Witherspoon's representations as to 
what Small Block had paid toward completion of the motorcycle. (Affidavit of Scott 
Kepler in Support of Restitution, pp.2-3; Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62, Ls.7-18 (testimony of Diana 
Witherspoon), p.67, L.5 - p.68, L.8 (testimony of Bruce Mountjoy, the insurance 
adjuster hired by National Indemnity).) Mrs. Witherspoon itemized Small Block's 
expenses as follows: 
Von Zippers (labor)35 
Shumate Motorsports (Harley Davidson Motor) 
Ted's Cycle (unspecified parts) 





35 After Mr. Maxwell's trial, wherein Mr. Witherspoon had made it clear that the $5,000 
payment made to Mr. Maxwell had been a loan independent of any agreement 
regarding the motorcycle, Mrs. Witherspoon again tried to characterize that payment as 
compensation for the labor he put into the motorcycle. (See Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62, Ls.19-
23.) 
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Ted's Cycle (unspecified parts) 
Idaho Independent Bank (cost of cashier's check 
provided to Ted's Cycles) 
Idaho Department of Transportation (sales tax and fees) 







(Affidavit of Scott Kepler in Support of Restitution, pp.2-3 & exs.1-9; Tr. Vol. VIII, p.62, 
Ls. 7-18 (testimony of Diana Witherspoon), p.67, L.5 - p.68, L.8 (testimony of Bruce 
Mountjoy, the insurance adjuster hired by National Indemnity).) 
Ultimately, the district court granted National Indemnity's full restitution request. 
("Amended" Order to Pay Restitution as a Condition of Probation (Jan. 27, 2011 ); 
"Amended" Civil Judgment (Jan. 27, 2011 ); Tr. Vol. VIII, p.94, Ls.6-11.) 
Mr. Maxwell submits the sum awarded to National Indemnity for restitution 
($15,044.11) was erroneously calculated. Although this is almost certainly the amount 
National Indemnity paid to its insured, Small Block, the fact is because of 
Mrs. Witherspoon's misrepresentations, National Indemnity overpaid Small Block by 
$5,000-the that Mrs. Witherspoon claimed was paid to Mr. Maxwell for his labor. As 
set forth above (see Statement of Facts and Part I, supra), the trial evidence makes it 
patently clear Small Block never paid Mr. Maxwell $5,000 for his work on the 
motorcycle; Small Block and Von Zippers were partners (or joint venturers) on the 
motorcycle project (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.3-8, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.23, Ls.5-15) and, more 
importantly for purposes of the restitution issue, the $5,000 paid to Mr. Maxwell was a 
separate loan from Witherspoon Homes to Von Zippers (Tr. Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.15, 
L.4, p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.1; Tr. Vol. VI, p.44, Ls.22-24). Accordingly, the $5,000 
36 This total, minus Small Block's $500 deductible, nearly matches the $15,044.11 paid 
to Small Block by National Indemnity. 
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payment to Mr. Maxwell is not an economic loss caused by Mr. Maxwell's criminal 
conduct in this case. See State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho at, 602-06 (2011). As such, 
restitution for this amount was impermissible under I.C. § 19-5304, and, therefore, this 
Court should reduce National Indemnity's restitution award by $5,000. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Maxwell respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his convictions and sentences and order an acquittal on the grand theft charge 
and a dismissal of the other two charges. Alternatively, he requests that the restitution 
amount awarded to National Indemnity Company be reduced by $5,000. 
DATED this 5th day of July, 2011. 
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